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1. Introduction
The Internet revolution has radically changed the way 
people, companies and governments communicate and con-
duct business. But at the same time, this global intercon-
nectedness increased the vulnerability of computer systems 
to information security breaches. Protection of information 
systems, data, intellectual property and business processes 
from attacks, misuse or technical failures has become and, ac-
cording to forecasts, will remain a key task for organizations.
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Наведені результати розробки моделі 
поведінки антагоністичних агентів в умо-
вах кіберконфлікта. Показано, що отримана 
модель може використовуватися для аналізу 
процесів інвестування в системах безпеки з 
урахуванням припущення, що на інвестицій-
ні процеси значною мірою впливає поведінка 
агентів, що беруть участь в кіберконфлікті.
Представлено загальні підходи до розроб-
ки моделі. Перш за все, сформована систе-
ма понять, припущень і обмежень, в рамках 
яких і повинна бути розроблена математич-
на модель поведінки. З урахуванням цього 
розроблено математичну модель поведін-
ки конфліктуючих агентів, яка представле-
на у вигляді алгебраїчних і диференціальних 
рівнянь. У розробленій моделі відображено 
як технічні характеристики системи безпе-
ки, так і психологічні особливості учасників 
кіберконфлікта, які впливають на фінан-
сові характеристики процесів інвестуван-
ня систем кібербезпеки. Відмінною особ-
ливістю пропонованої моделі є одночасний 
розгляд поведінки сторін кіберконфлікта не 
як незалежних сторін, а як взаїмовпливаю-
щих один на одного агентів. Модель також 
дозволяє імітувати вплив що дестабілізує 
на поведінку конфліктуючих сторін збурень 
з боку середовища протистояння, змінюючи 
ступінь уразливості системи кібербезпеки 
різних векторах атак і рівень успішності їх 
проведення.
З використанням розробленої моделі 
виконано імітаційне моделювання поведінки 
взаємодіючих агентів в умовах кіберконфлік-
та. Результати моделювання показали, що 
навіть найпростіші стратегії поведінки ата-
куючої сторони (“найслабша ланка”) і сто-
рони захисту (“чекай і дивись”) дозволяють 
забезпечити інформаційну безпеку контуру 
бізнес-процесів.
Розроблену модель взаємодії атакуючо-
го і захисника можна розглядати як інстру-
мент моделювання процесів поведінки кон-
фліктуючих сторін при реалізації різних 
сценаріїв інвестування. Результати моде-
лювання дають можливість особам, які 
приймають рішення, отримувати підтрим-
ку щодо напрямів інвестування в безпеку кон-
туру бізнес-процесів
Ключові слова: моделі поведінки, анта-
гоністичні агенти, дерево атаки, контур біз-
нес-процесів
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Studies related to the economics of information se-
curity [1–3], that is, the question of how much to spend 
on security countermeasures, despite their large number, 
demonstrate the following features.
First, most of them are purely economic in nature, that 
is, the discussion of investment issues in the cybersecurity 
system is conducted exclusively using financial categories 
such as investment portfolio, profitability, payback period, 
discounted profit, etc. [4–6]. That is, purely economic anal-
ysis methods are used to describe and analyze systems that, 
by their nature, are more organizational and technological.
Second, the findings of the researchers do not always 
coincide, and often they are just the opposite. This can be 
explained by the fact that investment in information security 
does not usually bring direct cash benefits, such as higher 
incomes or lower costs; their main contribution is to prevent 
possible economic losses [7, 8]. Again, this can be viewed as 
a discrepancy between the methods used and the features of 
the objects being analyzed.
Most of the publications consider the protection object 
as a kind of “black box”, to which various cyber attacks are 
directed, the effectiveness of opposing to which depends on 
the amount of funds invested in security. At the same time, 
no comments are made on where exactly the invested funds 
are directed. In other words, the structure of the protected 
object in terms of both executable operations and the re-
sources required for this is not done. At the same time, there 
is practically no mention in the publications about the level 
of protection provided, tacitly assuming that the higher the 
better [9, 10].
The data and systems protection efforts carried out by 
practitioners and scientists focused primarily on the tech-
nical aspects of cybersecurity, that is, which assets need 
protection at a certain level and which security countermea-
sures provide this protection. Taking into account the high 
cost of cybersecurity measures and budget constraints, a 
“fully protected organization” is not only a difficult, but also 
unattainable goal [11–13]. Instead of total protection of the 
organization, the organization’s business processes should 
be considered, on which the financial well-being of the or-
ganization depends, which can be viewed as the goal of the 
organization’s functioning. This view reflects a service-ori-
ented approach that defines important services and service 
packages in an organization. Threats and vulnerabilities are 
assessed in the context of services, and not for individual as-
sets. Because the organization has fewer services than assets, 
analysis takes less time and is better managed than assets. A 
service-oriented perspective is better connected with gener-
ating business revenue [14].
Business objectives and processes to support and achieve 
goals are in the focus of business risk assessment. The idea is 
to identify and analyze business processes and assign them 
value according to how they are related to business goals. To 
do this, vulnerabilities and threats for these processes are 
identified and assessed. The impact of accessibility, integrity 
and confidentiality violation on critical business processes, 
as well as information systems that support these processes, 
the valuation of which is directly related to business reve-
nues, is evaluated [15, 16].
There are several advantages in terms of business. 
Since this structure is based on the classic of business 
management – Michael E. Porter’s value chain model, it 
is much more comprehensible for the top management of 
the organization than the traditional model focused on 
assets-threat-vulnerability. The approach is efficient in 
terms of time, costs and resources, since a detailed anal-
ysis of assets, possible threats and vulnerabilities is not 
required. The main directions are set by important business 
processes. The approach also supports business process 
reengineering and business continuity planning, which 
would otherwise be performed as a separate analysis [17].
Thus, the loops of the organization’s business processes 
and security business processes should be the objects of 
protection.
The loop of the organization’s business processes is a set 
of information resources and related business processes, the 
fulfillment of which in a given sequence leads to the achieve-
ment of the organization’s goal:
{ }1 1 1, , , ..., , , .n n nBP BP BPBP BP BPBCS S IR T S IR T=
The security system business process loop is a set of 
business processes and the resources necessary for them, the 
implementation of which ensures the normal functioning of 
the organization’s business process loop:
{ }1 1 1, , , ..., , , .m m mBP BP BPBP BP BPSCS S Rs T S Rs T=
The practice of cyber defense of business processes has 
demonstrated the following feature. The effectiveness of cy-
ber defense of business process loops depends on the amount 
of investment that is directed to the respective areas. At the 
same time, decisions on the allocation of certain amounts 
fall within the “wait and see” scenario, i. e. decisions are of 
reactive nature and are taken upon the implementation of a 
successful cyber attack. On the other hand, the attacking 
side acts according to the “weakest link” scenario. Thus, the 
effectiveness of the creation and functioning of cyber defense 
systems is determined by the behavioral characteristics of 
the attacking and defending sides, which can be seen as con-
firming the relevance of developing behavioral patterns for 
the interacting parties of the cyber conflict.
2. Literature review and problem statement
Taking into account the remark made at the end of the 
previous section, it should be noted that the investment 
model of security systems should reflect, first of all, the 
behavioral characteristics of the participants in a cyber 
conflict.
The most frequently cited model of investing in in-
formation security is a single-period model [3, 4], which 
determines the optimal amount of investment to protect 
information and information systems. According to the 
Gordon-Loeb (GL) model, the optimal level of investment 
is achieved when the marginal utility of investment equals 
the marginal cost of investment. The proposed theoretical 
economic GL model has demonstrated that for the given 
functions of the probability of violation of the protection pe-
rimeter, the maximum amount that a risk-neutral company 
should invest in information security does not exceed 37 % 
of its expected losses due to security breaches. The authors 
of the GL model also state that firms with limited financial 
resources should focus on protecting information with medi-
um-level vulnerabilities, since protecting extremely sensitive 
information can be extremely expensive. Later, a modified 
Gordon-Loeb model [9] was proposed by expanding the 
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scope of the GL model, incorporating external effects and 
showing that socially optimal investments in information 
security increase by no more than 37 % of the expected loss.
It should be noted that the GL model is primarily a 
theoretical framework that helps security professionals un-
derstand the economics behind investing in information 
security. The authors of the GL model provided an illus-
trative example [10], demonstrating the definition of the 
appropriate level of investment in information security in 
the real case. However, the actual limitations in the practical 
implementation of the model are much more stringent.
Another limitation is related to the simplification of the 
model, according to which investments are directed to pro-
tecting the sole information resource of the organization. In 
fact, investments can be made to protect various information 
resources, as there are correlated risks in the system and 
modern practical solutions are often multifunctional. The 
third flaw questioned the suitability of the selected function 
families in the GL model. In [18, 19], it is argued that there is 
no reason to assume that the functions used reflect any real 
scenario for reducing vulnerability.
The GL model assumes the use of it by a risk-neutral 
decision maker (DM). In [20], optimal investment in secu-
rity is determined in case a decision is made by a non-risk-
minded decision-maker. In addition, the optimal level of 
investment depends on the asset to be protected, the vul-
nerability of the asset and the potential loss associated with 
it. The model also simulates one attack of a single attacker 
for one period with a fixed potential loss, which is an exces-
sive simplification of reality. Compared to the risk-neutral 
GL model, a non-risk-minded decision maker increases his 
investment while increasing the expected loss, but no more 
than the amount of the loss. Under these conditions, there is 
a minimum potential loss, below which the optimal invest-
ment is zero.
In [2], the optimal level of investment in security is 
investigated under various attack scenarios – in the case 
of targeted and opportunistic attacks. When there are no 
budget constraints, total investment falls when a partic-
ular vulnerability reaches a certain level. There is also a 
minimum level of vulnerability, below which investments 
are zero. When the total budget is limited, investments in 
protection against a certain type of attack increase, when 
potential losses from an attack increase, or when the budget 
size increases. The results of the analysis show that a lim-
ited budget is allocated to mitigate the vulnerabilities that 
cause the most damage, and which are often associated with 
targeted attacks, with the result that organizations with 
very limited security budgets are subject to opportunistic 
attacks. The same results with a similar approach based on 
the GL model were presented in [21].
The GL model [3, 10], the modified GL model [9] and 
the studies [2, 20–22] can be considered as theoretical 
foundations that provide good economic rationales for cy-
bersecurity investment decisions regarding the optimal level 
of investment and budget allocation to eliminate certain vul-
nerabilities. However, the simplifying assumptions are too 
broad to use these approaches in practice, regardless of the 
size of the firm that plans the investment. An information re-
source used by a business process is rarely exposed to a single 
threat or attacked by a single attacker. Investment decisions 
in these approaches are made on the basis of a combination of 
vulnerability and size of loss, which is treated as permanent. 
Models operate with a single variable in the risk equation, 
namely, with decreasing overall vulnerability, to reduce the 
likelihood of attacks that cause the most damage. In fact, the 
risk equation can be solved by taking the level of exposure 
instead or using a combination of detection, preventive or 
corrective measures.
Another analytical model [23], which considers the 
optimal level of investment in information security, has 
more realistic assumptions, such as the presence of various 
simultaneous attacks, and the model’s goal is to analyze 
the distribution of investments in relation to targeted and 
opportunistic attacks.
Even if we exclude the theoretical nature of the models 
analyzed above and assume that they can be used in practice, 
the approaches are not universal, equally acceptable for dif-
ferent business structures. The considered models are more 
focused on large firms with a deep hierarchy of management. 
The upper level determines the amount of finance that can 
be used to ensure information security, and the next levels 
in the organization choose measures in accordance with the 
budget constraint. A small firm has a single budget that in-
cludes all of its investments and expenses. Each investment 
in information security must compete for limited financial 
resources with other investments. The models that optimize 
the information security budget are aimed primarily at large 
companies with complex business processes.
The “analytic hierarchy process” (AHP) is a universal 
mathematical method for making multi-criteria decisions, 
including both quantitative and qualitative criteria, as well 
as expert assessments. In [24], instead of constructing a 
mathematical investment model, it was proposed to consider 
the investment process as a multi-criteria task. To solve it, 
it is necessary to define many goals, set their priority and 
importance for decision-makers, to form a set of quantitative 
and qualitative indicators of achieving goals. The rules of 
comparison (preference) of their values, presented both in 
quantitative and qualitative terms, should also be specified. 
The AHP approach is used not only to evaluate alternatives 
to investing in information security in order to make the 
most effective use of a limited security budget, but also to 
justify additional investments in security, if possible. The 
authors propose to use the evaluation option of the AHP, 
forming criteria and subcriteria for the distribution of in-
vestment budget funds, as well as determining the weights 
of these criteria. Each alternative to maintain and improve 
security is evaluated for each criterion and subcriterion 
separately, and then receives an assessment that reflects how 
well the alternative distribution of the invested funds meets 
a certain criterion or subcriterion. The proposed criteria are: 
confidentiality, data integrity, and availability. The latter 
can be divided into three subcriteria: authentication, reli-
ability and availability. Each criterion and subcriterion may 
have different importance. The following importance esti-
mates were proposed in [24]: exceptionally high, extremely 
high, very high, high, fairly high, and moderately high. This 
rating scale allows you to correctly justify decisions made in 
the absence of quantitative assessments, replacing them with 
appropriate qualitative expert assessments.
The AHP methodology requires careful preliminary 
preparation – a clear definition of the criteria, sub-criteria 
and obtaining their comparative assessments. It is necessary 
to determine the essence of the criteria importance, which 
are subjective in nature and can be interpreted differently by 
decision-makers. It is often difficult to establish boundaries 
between the importance of criteria. For example, grades: 
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exceptionally high, extremely high, very high, high, fairly 
high, and moderately high have very close meanings. Even 
if the importance of the criteria is well defined, the nature 
of uncertainty in the case of information security risks can 
make the assessment problematic. Using the AHP to eval-
uate information security investment alternatives requires 
good security expertise and a thorough understanding of the 
methodology. The described methods can be implemented in 
the behavior models of interacting agents of cybersecurity 
systems in the case of a significant variety of implemented 
attacks and means of counteracting them. However, real sta-
tistics of cyberattacks committed, even in relation to critical 
infrastructure facilities, show that the variety of attacks, as 
well as countermeasures, is insignificant. The variety and 
intensity of threats depend, first of all, on the capabilities of 
the attacker (the power of his computing facilities), secondly, 
on the goals and objectives of the attacker, and thirdly, on 
the “price” of confidential information.
In [25], a class of business structures is pointed out 
for which the AHP approach may be acceptable, as well 
as difficulties associated with its preparation and use are 
noted. The approach can be used by small firms to evaluate 
investment alternatives if they have clear security objectives, 
which is doubtful. At the same time, there is a need to search 
for security experts as consultants who have knowledge and 
experience of working with the model, while working close-
ly with the CEO of the company to decide on the criteria, 
sub-criteria and their importance for the company. This is 
a time-consuming process, and the economic justification 
for using this approach is doubtful, since the analysis itself 
may be more expensive than the solution necessary to ensure 
security.
[26] demonstrated the possibility of combining the AHP 
method with linear programming to select alternative op-
tions for investing in information security. Despite a rather 
unexpected combination of decision support methods, the 
main direction of the methods used is optimization of the 
investment project portfolio in the field of information tech-
nology (IT) security in the organization. The motivation 
for using the proposed approach is extremely conflicting 
and changing requirements for the cybersecurity of orga-
nizations, in addition to the variety of initial conditions 
encountered in organizations. The peculiarity of using the 
proposed combination of methods is as follows. Instead of 
ranking or evaluating various alternatives based solely on 
their advantages, by defining the goals of the organization 
and then coordinating the decisions with the goals, it is 
possible to optimally allocate resources for all projects in the 
investment portfolio. The approach described in this article 
is to provide a general decision-making structure that can 
be adapted by practitioners and adjusted by other research-
ers. The proposed approach may be of interest in modeling 
the behavior of a group of decision-makers with their own 
preferences, with subsequent coordination of decisions and 
preferences.
In [27], an optimization model is presented that com-
bines the cost of selected security measures and the level 
of confidence in achieving security goals. Discrete dynam-
ic programming was used to obtain a Pareto optimality 
compromise curve containing alternative security solu-
tions. Budget constraint dictates the best security solution 
available on a crooked compromise. According to [28], the 
proposed method is limited and does not allow finding 
equivalent security alternatives with the same confidence 
level. In [28], an evolutionary optimization algorithm is used 
to determine equivalent safety profiles at the same cost level.
The disadvantage of both models is the lack of consider-
ation of the measures interaction in the security profile. The 
security measures in the profile, apparently, are aggregated 
mechanically, without taking into account the overall effec-
tiveness. In other words, these methods are not applicable in 
the context of synergistic threats. In general, the methods 
may be applicable in large firms to agree on alternative sets 
of security measures. At the same time, the methods require 
a deep understanding of the organization’s security goals 
and the necessary actions and resources to achieve the goals. 
The interconnection of security goals and business goals 
(that is, the interaction of the loops of business processes 
and security processes) is not provided by the mentioned 
methods.
In [29], the dilemma of the system administrator is 
solved, that is, security measures are selected within the 
budget constraint and at the same time, residual damage 
is minimized. The paper considers the security problem as 
a series of successive attacks by an attacker to achieve his 
goal. The attacker is looking for vulnerabilities that can be 
used to penetrate the system to find new vulnerabilities in 
the system for further development. It is also assumed that 
the attacker can bypass the defense at a certain cost. The 
authors argue that the decision to manage security should 
take into account the possible benefits of the attacker. The 
attacker is not motivated to attack if the effort exceeds the 
gain. At the same time, the authors argue that the goal of the 
attacker can only be damage, so the benefit does not have 
to be a monetary gain. An attack tree is used to model the 
dynamic interaction between the attacker and the defender. 
Multipurpose optimization and competitive co-evolution 
were chosen to conduct a cost-benefit analysis. The authors 
emphasize the importance of a long-term security policy and 
that countermeasures should not be based on cost-benefit 
calculations of intermediate strategies.
The attacker’s description, motivation, and actions indi-
cate that this approach is more suitable for analyzing target-
ed than random attacks. This computationally complex ap-
proach is based on game theory methods, which puts forward 
certain requirements for both the design of models and their 
further use. Despite its complexity, the described model is 
too simplified to cover the cost aspects of security measures. 
The model assumes that security measures are independent 
of each other, which is not a practical assumption. Security 
effectiveness can be achieved when the selected set of se-
curity measures takes into account interdependencies. The 
authors define security measures as preventive measures to 
stop an attacker who has reached his goal. The focus is on the 
costs and benefits of the attacker. The model does not clearly 
take into account the choice of recovery measures in order 
to reduce the costs that arise in the event of attacks. In some 
cases, it may be appropriate not to invest in the prevention 
of attacks, but to invest in minimizing the costs arising from 
attacks. By its nature, this model is perhaps the most consis-
tent with the tasks of constructing models of the behavior of 
interacting agents under conditions of cyber conflict.
The work [30] considers the problem of investments 
in information security related to cash costs of implemen-
tation, indirect costs and risk reduction. The paper intro-
duces a distinction between “passive” and “active” threats. 
The former represent attacks independent of defense, the 
latter show the attacker’s ability to respond to implement-
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ed defense. The peculiarity of the work is that it considers 
multistage attacks and potential correlations in successful 
actions at various stages. The combined effectiveness of 
countermeasures is determined by choosing the effec-
tiveness that is the highest among them. The paper uses 
nonlinear multipurpose integer programming and mixed 
transforms of integer and linear programming to find Pare-
to optimal solutions.
In [31], a methodology is presented for finding the 
optimal combination of security measures within a given 
budget. The first step is to analyze risks and evaluate the 
effectiveness of countermeasures against various vulnera-
bilities. Based on the results of the risk assessment, control 
games between the defender and the attacker are simulated 
using various vulnerabilities. Multipurpose multiple-choice 
knapsack optimization techniques are used in the solutions 
of various control games in order to decide on the distribu-
tion of the security budget. In [32], stochastic programming 
is used to make investment decisions on various types of 
countermeasures within a given budget. In addition to the 
security competency required to use the approaches, experi-
ence in mathematical modeling is also required. The models 
presented above deal with the problem of finding the best set 
of countermeasures that maximize security within limited 
financial resources.
The work [33], devoted to the choice of security mea-
sures, uses the attack tree approach to analyze information 
security risks and assess the cost and probability of success 
of attacks from the attacker’s point of view. The authors 
consider rational profit-oriented attackers who compare 
their success and benefits with the cost of carrying out the 
attack and possible fines if they are captured and punished. 
A rational attacker is unlikely to attack if the expected costs 
exceed the benefits. The paper suggests a simple method of 
economic justification of security measures – the search for 
an adequate set of measures sufficient from a security point 
of view. Sufficiency in the context of the proposed model 
means the minimum probability of an attack, which is con-
sidered as the main one. Adequacy implies that the cost of 
protective measures should not exceed the value of the assets 
to be protected.
The model takes into account two players – the attacker, 
who is aimed at a specific organization. In fact, an attacker 
can have several goals. A rational attacker will attack the 
company where he expects the greatest benefit. Thus, any 
security measure that makes an attack more costly for an 
attacker can prevent the attack. The formulation of the 
sufficiency condition established in the model, which may 
turn out to be economically irrational, is also doubtful. The 
ultimate goal of a rationally acting company is not to prevent 
attacks, but to minimize the risk of them. It may be more 
costly for a company to prevent an attack than to invest in 
security measures that minimize the impact of the attack. 
Therefore, the sufficiency condition in this model can lead to 
excessive investment in security.
The use of game theory methods to assess not only 
investment volumes, but also their effective distribution 
by objects that differ in the amount of information, vul-
nerability, and probability of attack, is given in [34]. The 
authors of the work rightly note that the search for a solu-
tion is complicated by the uncertainty of the opponent’s 
actions. Under these conditions, a satisfactory solution is 
proposed that corresponds to the saddle point of the objec-
tive function. This function can express one of the indica-
tors of the defense system – the share of lost information, 
profit from investments in defense, their profitability – 
depending on the ratio of attack and defense resources, 
accordingly. The paper analyzes the conditions for the 
existence of a saddle point in one- and two-level systems, 
which differ in the number of objects and obstacles that 
protect them. The intervals of the ratios of the means of 
the attacking and the defending sides are found in which 
a saddle point can exist. It is shown that the saddle point 
existence intervals are determined by the form of dynamic 
vulnerability of objects and the distribution of informa-
tion among objects. However, it should be noted that the 
application of this approach encounters certain difficulties 
in practical implementation. First of all, all strategies for 
the behavior of opponents should be known, which allows 
you to build a complete game matrix. Cost estimates of 
player behavior strategies should also be known. At the 
same time, the construction of the objective function may 
turn out to be an ambiguous process due to the incomplete 
awareness of the player about the possible response actions 
of the enemy. All these requirements for the mathematical 
formulation of the problem can make the application of 
game theory methods extremely difficult and sometimes 
impossible [35, 36].
In [37], an approach is presented related to the applica-
tion of game theory for predicting the behavior of players, as 
well as designing mechanisms for the interaction of agents 
with directly opposite goals. Attention should also be paid 
to the presented explanation of how a large number of people 
with different interests interact (the so-called non-coalition 
or non-cooperative games) in modern global technical sys-
tems, such as the Internet. In particular, the explanation of 
how in such systems the common good is often achievable 
without the intervention of a single governing body (“dicta-
tor”) is noteworthy.
In [38], an approach to the construction of a cyber world 
is proposed, which is designed to study the security of cy-
ber systems operating on the Internet. These systems are 
represented as a complex of various interacting teams of in-
telligent agents. This work differs from other similar ones in 
that it considers various options for the interaction of team 
agents, which can be both in a state of antagonistic confron-
tation and cooperation. The task of analyzing interacting 
agents is considered as an example of distributed denial of 
service attacks. The environment was implemented on the 
basis of a discrete event modeling system, which made it 
possible to integrate agent-based modeling with simulation 
of basic Internet protocols. Despite the technical elaboration 
of approaches to modeling agent behavior, issues of assessing 
the economic efficiency of interaction or opposition are not 
considered in the work. However, it can be considered as the 
foundation on which the “building” of economic assessments 
of the effectiveness of the strategies used for the behavior of 
interacting agents can be built.
An example of the practical application of the behav-
ior models of interacting agents under conditions of cyber 
conflict is given in [39]. A search model for rational options 
for strategies for mutual investment management in the 
cybersecurity systems of large educational institutions is 
considered. The work demonstrates various relationships be-
tween the parameters of investing in cybersecurity systems 
and solving other problems related to the protection of the 
information and educational environment of large educa-
tional institutions. The developed model is recommended 
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primarily as an information-algorithmic component for a 
decision support system for the analysis and optimization 
of mutual investment strategies in the information and ed-
ucational environment of educational institutions and their 
cybersecurity systems. The difference between the proposed 
solution and similar in this segment of scientific research 
is the ability to determine specific parameters and recom-
mendations in the process of mutual investment. Reference 
should be made to the work [40], in which the issues of cyber 
defense of educational resources are brought up to the level 
of development of a classifier for cyber threats, which allows 
to give cost estimates of both information resources and the 
costs of attacks and means of counteracting them. 
Studies related to the economics of information securi-
ty, that is, the question of how much you need to spend on 
security countermeasures, despite their multiplicity, demon-
strate the following features. Firstly, most of them are purely 
economic in nature, that is, the discussion of investment 
issues in the cybersecurity system is conducted exclusively 
using financial categories, such as investment portfolio, 
profitability, payback period, discounted profit, etc. That is, 
methods of analysis of purely economic systems are used to 
describe and analyze systems that, by their nature, are more 
socio-technological.
Secondly, the findings of the researchers do not always 
coincide, and often they are just the opposite. This can be 
explained by the fact that investment in information security 
does not usually bring direct cash benefits, such as higher 
incomes or lower costs; their main contribution is to prevent 
possible economic losses. Again, this can be viewed as a dis-
crepancy between the methods used and the features of the 
objects being analyzed.
In most publications, the object of protection is consid-
ered as a kind of “black box”, to which various cyber attacks 
are directed, the repel efficiency of which depends on the 
amount of funds invested in security. At the same time, no 
comments are made on where exactly the invested funds are 
directed. In other words, the structure of the protected ob-
ject in terms of both executable operations and the resources 
required for this is not done. However, there is practically 
no mention in the publications about the level of protection 
provided, tacitly assuming that the higher the better.
3. The aim and objectives of the study
The aim of the study is to develop a model of the behavior 
of antagonistic agents under a cyber conflict, the purpose of 
which is the possibility of scenario modeling of the behavior 
of the parties to cyber conflict, ultimately influencing the 
choice of the direction of investing limited financial resourc-
es of the investment budget.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following 
tasks:
– to identify the basic concepts that are used in models 
of interaction of antagonistic agents and directly affect the 
decision-making on the direction of investment to protect 
against a particular attack vector, as well as the assumptions 
and limitations of the model;
– to develop the mathematical model of interaction be-
tween the parties to the conflict, influencing the adoption or 
change of previously made investment decisions;
– to perform simulation modeling based on the devel-
oped mathematical model to confirm the logic of the behav-
ior of the parties to the conflict and assess the impact of their 
behavior on the use of investments.
4. Basic concepts in models of interaction between  
the parties under a cyber conflict
The analysis carried out in [41] made it possible to for-
mulate a list of basic concepts and categories used in the 
description of investment processes in security systems that 
should be used in the developed model of antagonistic agents 
behavior. Table 1 presents the basic concepts related to in-
vestment strategies in cybersecurity systems that underlie 
the interaction of the defender and the attacker in a dynamic 
behavior model.
Table	1
Basic	concepts	in	the	models	of	interaction	of	the	cyber	
conflict	parties	
Concept Definition
Reputation
Favorable and universally recognized name or 
reputation for merits, achievements, reliability, 
etc. In this case, the reputation refers to the public 
authority of the company
Vulnerability
The level of security possessed by company assets. 
It can also be called the asset protection level
Security 
Vectors
Security vectors are externally visible and accessi-
ble system resources that can be used to organize 
attacks on the system. The weight (or magnitude) 
of the vector is set in accordance with the poten-
tial damage that could be caused by any exploita-
tion of the vulnerability.
Examples of security vectors are: network servers, 
web pages, email, mobile devices, system configu-
ration, and others
Defender  
Opportunities
Available resources are distributed among assets 
to increase the level of asset sustainability
Attackers  
Opportunities
Part of the resources of attackers available for dis-
tribution among the defender’s assets
Share of 
investment
Part of the opportunities aimed at protecting the 
company’s assets
Share of 
attacks
The number of attacks that cybercriminals distrib-
ute between the security vectors of defenders in 
accordance with previous successful attacks
Successful 
attacks
Attacks capable to violate asset protection through 
security vectors
Profit of 
Defenders
Monetary benefit from improving asset security, 
which in turn enhances reputation, thereby im-
proving financial performance
Attackers 
Welfare
Monetary advantage from violation of defenders’ 
assets
“WeakLink” 
Investment 
Strategy
The weak link strategy is that the attacker ratio-
nally puts more effort into attacking systems with 
a low level of security. Once the organization’s 
perimeter is broken, attackers can often take ad-
vantage of this
“Wait and 
See” Invest-
ment Strategy
The basic idea is that in case of uncertainty about 
the expected benefits, it may be better to wait 
for key events. Once a security breach occurs, 
more information appears to evaluate the expected 
benefits of security investment, which makes the 
assessment more accurate
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The formed concepts should be included in the mathe-
matical model, since they reflect the nature of the interaction 
of the parties to the conflict and influence the distribution of 
limited investment funds.
The model was based on the assumptions and limitations 
presented in Fig. 1.
The following should be indicated as the main 
limitations of the developed model. The model is 
limited to only three threat vectors and means to 
counter them. Such a restriction from the point of 
view of the practical implementation of the model is 
reasonable, based on the variety of attacks carried 
out on a particular object. It is also not critical, since 
the proposed model can be easily adapted not only 
for a specific type of cyberattack, but also for their 
number.
The second limitation of the model is the unified 
cost of cyber attacks for all vectors, and independent 
of countermeasures. This limitation can also be easily 
removed in the process of adapting the model for a par-
ticular cyber attack object and type.
The model also does not include various financial 
indicators and approaches for analyzing each invest-
ment decision, such as: cost-benefit analysis, risk anal-
ysis, net present value (NPV), annual loss expectancy 
(ALE), return on security investment (ROSI), and 
others. The reason for this is that financial analysis 
would require a more complex model, including empir-
ical data, to give greater accuracy to the results of the 
study. These issues can be considered as directions for 
future research.
5. Development of a mathematical model of  
the behavior of the parties to  
cyber conflict
The model focuses on the dynamics of the inter-
action of the attacker and the defender in the field of 
information security in order to discover the invest-
ment strategies used by opponents.
The model represents a defender who protects as-
sets from a group of cybercriminals trying to compro-
mise a company’s assets with cyber attacks. An asset 
can take many forms, such as a customer list, website, 
payables register, or strategic plan. Increased security 
may be associated with protecting the confidentiality, 
integrity, authenticity or availability of the asset for 
authorized users.
The formation of the model is limited by three 
possible threats, which can be considered as separate 
security vectors of access to the company’s informa-
tion assets. Each information asset can be protected 
by investing in appropriate protection. For each 
security vector, there is one access method and one 
protection method. Finally, protection is effective if 
it can repel incoming attacks.
The model consists of three submodels, which 
are shown in Fig. 2: defender submodels, confron-
tation environment submodels, and attacker sub- 
models.
The Defender’s model represents a defense mech-
anism against cyber attacks aimed at violating the 
security of an information asset. In each period, the 
defender makes a decision on choosing the target 
investment information resource to determine his 
own protection configuration. It is assumed that the 
defenders have basic protection for each vector, and 
their capabilities are sufficient for additional efforts 
undertaken in case of security breaches.
The defender organizes the protection of his own infor-
mation assets with the help of countermeasures displayed 
by three security vectors (A, B and C). The result of the 
defense, ultimately, affects the reputation of the company, 
Attacker 
Attackers 
Capabilities
Attack Vector A Attack Vector B Attack Vector C
Defender Defenders
Capabilities
Investment 
Vector
A
Investment 
Vector
В
Investment 
Vector
С
Battlefield
Vulnerability
Vector
A 
Vulnerability
Vector
B 
Vulnerability
Vector
C 
Fig.	2.	General	structure	of	the	interaction	model
Assumptions and limitations of the model 
The
influence of 
cyberattacks
on the 
company 
reputation
Defenders
Opportunities 
The cost of 
a single 
attack 
Types of 
Attacks and 
Attackers 
Security cost 
Reputation damage is considered the indirect costs that the 
company incurs as a result of cyber attacks. 
The model assumes the value for each of the three security 
vectors as the weight that they attach to their reputation, as 
well as the status of vector vulnerabilities and successful 
attacks 
The model used assumes that the budget for information 
security does not depend on the financial performance of the 
company
Attackers 
Opportunities 
Opportunities for attackers are assumed to be constant for 
each period. It is not known how attackers behave, on what 
they base their economic justification and how they form 
their resources for future attacks 
The cost of a single attack determines the damage that a 
single attack does to defenders. The cost of a single attack is 
how much money the defender needs to stop the attack
The model does not distinguish between internal and external 
attackers, they are identical, their number is not determined. 
The model does not break attacks into various types 
The cost of security is reflected in the decision on the shares 
of investments in each security vector when it is violated
Fig.	1.	Assumptions	and	limitations	of	the	behavior	model
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which can be measured by financial results. In the model, 
security vectors are described by the vulnerability state 
of each vector. At the end of the attack, information about 
its success or reflection (indicating a specific security 
vector) becomes available. For each of the vectors, suc-
cessful and repulsed attacks are counted. The share of 
investments for each security vector is calculated based 
on the share of successful attacks on this vector in the 
total number of successful attacks. This means that the 
defender will invest the appropriate share of investments 
in the corresponding security vector, which is proportion-
al to the number of successful attacks conducted against 
this vector.
Reputation is measured in relative units. Reputation 
is adjusted based on the results of successful or repulsed 
attacks across all security vectors. In the case of repulsed 
attacks, the reputation of the company increases, while suc-
cessful attacks result in a loss of reputation.
The financial indicators of the defenders are determined 
on the basis of expert estimates of the monetary value of each 
reputation score.
The attacker is aimed at violating the security of the 
company’s business processes and makes some efforts to 
attack. Since the attacker does not know exactly what re-
sources his attack should be directed to, for gaining profit he 
bases his actions on the knowledge of the successful attacks 
distribution on target resources known to him from previous 
experience.
The attacker identifies and uses the weakest link, i. e. the 
security vector with the lowest protection. If the attacker 
succeeds, he will make a profit, which will correspond to 
lower financial indicators for the defender. The attacker does 
not act indiscriminately; he rather attacks only when it is 
beneficial.
Successful historical attacks in the attacker’s model 
prompt him to direct attacks to the weakest link, not ne-
glecting the other objectives of the attack, but allocating a 
smaller part of the resources for their attack.
The sum of the accumulated successful attacks for each 
vector allows the attacker to determine the weakest link and 
make a decision for the next attack in order to use the most 
vulnerable security vector.
The distribution of the attack direction is determined 
by the attackers as a result of the accumulated successful 
attacks for each vector. To implement the strategy of the 
weakest link in this model, attackers must switch from one 
direction of attack to another when the current direction is 
not favorable for him to continue attacks.
To make a decision on changing the attack vector, it is 
necessary to compare the current value of accumulated suc-
cessful attacks with the same value for the previous period. 
To do this, the “switch” parameter is used, which indicates 
that when the ratio of the current value to the value of the 
previous period is less than 1, it is not profitable for the 
attacker to continue using this vector and it is necessary to 
proceed to attacks in other directions.
Whenever an attacker decides to stop attacking one 
vector and switch to another, investments directed to other 
vectors will increase.
The effectiveness of attackers is the sum of violations of 
all vectors multiplied by the cost of a single attack. The wel-
fare of attackers is determined by financial indicators, the in-
crease of which is a function of the productivity of attackers.
To reflect the interaction of defenders and intruders, 
each of which has certain capabilities and make appropri-
ate investment decisions, a third model is implemented – a 
model of the confrontation environment (battlefield). The 
main variables of this model are vulnerability and successful 
attacks on each security vector.
Vulnerability means the security level of each of the 
attack vectors. The positive value of the vulnerability in-
dicates the weaknesses in ensuring security in this area of 
protection. This indicator can be calculated based on the 
ratio of defender and attacker investments in this area of 
defense and attack.
In essence, the vulnerability is determined by the differ-
ence between the resources that the attacker directs to the 
corresponding vector and the resources that the defender 
allocates to fix security flaws in the same vector.
Successful attacks are important for this model, as 
they will initiate subsequent investment decisions for 
both opponents. So if the vulnerability of the vector is 
below zero, there will be no successful attacks, since 
the defender has equal or superior capabilities than the 
attacker, and he is able to repel all attacks. On the other 
hand, if the vulnerability of the vector is above zero, suc-
cessful attacks should be expected. The share of invested 
funds to protect a given direction in combination with the 
cost of repelling an attack in this direction determines the 
number of attacks that a defender can repel in case of a 
security breach.
The constants used in the model, which are set at the 
beginning of the simulation and allow modeling various 
scenarios of the interaction of antagonistic agents and the 
distribution of investments following from this, are present-
ed in Table 2.
Table	2
Parameters	of	the	behavior	model	of	the	interacting	parties	
to	the	conflict
Symbol Description
c1 Number of Dismissed Attacks
c2 Activated Uncertainty
c3 Attackers Capabilities
c4 Attack Unitary Cost
c5 Base financial performance
c6 Base reputation
c7 Defenders Capabilities
c8 Dismissal time
c9 Information Sharing
c10 Reputation to money rate
c11 Time of reputation loss
c12 Time to build up reputation
c13 Time to report attack
c14 Vector A Value
c15 Vector B Value
c16 Vector C Value
The designations of the variables used in the model are 
presented in Table 3.
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Table	3
Variables	of	the	behavior	model	of	the	interacting	parties	to	
the	conflict	
Symbol Description Symbol Description
x1 Reputation x25
Vulnerability of 
Vector B
x2 Reported Reputation x26
Vulnerability of 
Vector C
x3 Adjustment x27
Successful Attacks on 
Vector A
x4 Dismissed A x28
Successful Attacks on 
Vector B
x5 Dismissed B x29
Successful Attacks on 
Vector C
x6 Dismissed C x30 Breaches Vector A
x7
Defenders Financial 
Performance
x31 Breaches Vector B
x8
Fraction of Attacks on 
Vector A
x32 Breaches Vector C
x9
Fraction of Attacks on 
Vector B
x33
Accumulated Suc-
cessful Attacks on 
Vector A
x10
Fraction of Attacks on 
Vector C
x34
Accumulated  
Successful Attacks on 
Vector B
x11 Report on Vector A x35
Accumulated  
Successful Attacks on 
Vector C
x12 Report on Vector B x36 Past Value A
x13 Report on Vector C x37 Past Value B
x14
Reported Successful 
Attacks on A
x38 Past Value C
x15
Reported Successful 
Attacks on B
x39 Switch A
x16
Reported Successful 
Attacks on C
x40 Switch B
x17
Fraction of Invest-
ment in Vector A
x41 Switch C
x18
Fraction of Invest-
ment in Vector B
x42 Attackers performance
x19
Fraction of Invest-
ment in Vector C
x43
Accumulated Attack-
ers Wealth
x20 High Uncertainty x44
Defenders Accumulat-
ed Profits
x21 Low Uncertainty x45 Adjustment
x22 Middle Uncertainty x46 Erosion
x23 Uncertainty x47
Accumulated  
Attackers Wealth
x24
Vulnerability of 
Vector A
x48
Increasing Financial 
Performance
A formal presentation of the basic relationships between 
the variables described earlier and determining the essence 
of the relationship between the participants in the cyber 
conflict, leading to a change in the investment scenario and 
the redistribution of funds, is given below in the form of 
an algebraic and differential equation system. Taking into 
account the presence of feedback in the real interaction of 
the parties of the cyber conflict (reinforcing and damping 
circuits), the moment of time should be indicated for each 
variable, however, such a record significantly cluttered the 
system of equations.
 
dx1/dt=x45–x46,
x2=c6–(c14×x24)–(c15×x25)–(c16×x26), 
x3=x2–x1,
x4=c1/c8,
x5=c1/c8,
x6=c1/c8,
x7=(c10×x1)+c5,
x8=x39×x33/(x33+x40×x34+x41×x35),
x9=x40×x34/(x39×x33+x34+x41×x35),
x10=x41×x35/(x39×x33+x40×x34+x35),
x11=x27/c13,
x12=x28/c13,
x13=x29/c13,
dx14/dt=x11–x4,
dx15/dt=x12–x5,
dx16/dt=x13–x6,
x17=x14/(x14+x15+x16),
x18=x15/(x14+x15+x16),
x19=x16/(x14+x15+x16),
x20=c9×rnd(min((0.75+0.00498×t),0.999), 
max(1.5–(0.00998)×t, 1.001))+(1–c9)×rnd0.75,1.5),
x21=c9×rnd(min((0.95+0.0008×t),0.999), 
max(1.1–(0.0018)×t, 1.001))+(1–c9)×rnd (0.95,1.1),
x22=c9×rnd(min((0.875+0.00248×t),0.999), 
max(1.25–(0.00498)×t, 1.001))+(1–c9)×
×rnd (0.875,1.25),
x23=if(c2=0,1, if(c2=2,x22, if(c2=1, x21, x20))),
x24=(c3×x8×c4×x23)–(c7×x17),
x25=(c3×x9×c4×x23)–(c7×x18),
x26=(c3×x10×c4×x23)–(c7×x19),
x27=if(x24>0, ((c3×x8)–((c7×x17)/c4)), 0),
x28=if(x25>0, ((c3×x9)–((c7×x18)/c4)), 0),
x29=if(x26>0, ((c3×x10)–((c7×x19)/c4)), 0),
x30=x27/c13,
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x31=x28/c13,
x32=x29/c13,
dx33/dt=x30,
dx34/dt=x31,
dx35/dt=x32,
x36=delay(x33, 1,0),
x37=delay(x34, 1,0),
x38=delay(x35, 1,0),
x39=if(x33–x36<l,0,1),
x40=if(x34–x37<1,0,1),
x41=if(x35–x38<l,0,1),
x42=((x30)+(x31)+(x32))×c4,
dx43/dt=x47,
dx44/dt=x48,
x45=if(x3>0, (x3/c12), 0),
x46=if(x3<0, (abs(x3/c11)), 0).
The resulting system of equations describes the behavior 
of the attacker and defender in the process of cyber conflict, 
the interaction of which determines the direction of invest-
ment in the security system of the business process loop, as 
well as the moments of the direction change.
6. Simulation of the interacting agents behavior
The described model of interaction between attacking 
and defending sides was used to simulate their behavior in 
various conditions from the point of view of choosing strat-
egies for investing in a cybersecurity system. In accordance 
with the developed methodology for modeling the behavior 
of interacting agents under conditions of cyber conflict [41], 
the developed mathematical model was implemented in the 
dynamic system simulation tool PowerSim (Powersim Soft-
ware AS, Norway). It should be noted that any software that 
supports the simulation of dynamic systems can be used as a 
modeling environment. Alternatively MATLAB+Simulink, 
AnyLogic, etc. can be offered.
As an option, modeling of the “weakest link” mechanism 
was chosen. This mechanism initiates investment strategies 
for both attackers and advocates. It is the process of inter-
action between the attacking and the defending parties that 
allows you to determine the weakest link in their vectors in 
order to decide on the direction and amount of investment. 
The mechanism of the weakest link starts with the initial 
conditions, reflected in the accumulated successful attacks 
in the submodel of attackers.
As the initial conditions, zero conditions were chosen for 
financial indicators (accumulated costs of attacks and their 
protection). To start the model and select the initial attack 
vector, some initial spread in the values of the accumulated 
successful attacks on the considered vectors must be specified. 
Otherwise, the attack vector should be selected randomly (the 
given version of the program does not provide this).
The initial conditions for successful attacks accumulated 
by attackers will determine the subsequent actions for both 
opponents. Whenever one security vector is violated in pro-
tection, significantly exceeding the other vectors, attackers 
use it. For a basic launch, the initial conditions for accumu-
lated successful attacks are presented in Table 4.
Table	4
Initial	modeling	conditions	for	the	“Weakest	Link”	scenario
Accumulated Successful Attacks. Vector A 100
Accumulated Successful Attacks. Vector B 75
Accumulated Successful Attacks. Vector C 50
In this case, vector A is the weakest link identified by the 
attacker in the first period. The initial values were chosen 
in such a way as to visually reflect the preference that the 
attacker gives to one of the vectors compared to the others. 
However, there is a second preferred vector (vector B), show-
ing the share of the attackers’ capabilities allocated for each 
successful attack of the vector.
Fig. 3 shows successful attacks for all three attack vec-
tors. An interesting feature can be noted on this graph − a 
change in the proportion of analyzed attack vectors that the 
attacker performs as soon as another weak link is detected.
Fig.	3.	Distribution	of	successful	attacks	by		
vectors	(x27,	x28,	x29)
Fig. 4 shows the dynamics of the accumulation of suc-
cessful vector attacks. In case of successful completion of the 
attack, the value of the counter of successful attacks of the 
corresponding vector simply increases by units.
Fig.	4.	Accumulation	of		
successful	vector	attacks	(x33,	x34,	x35)
Along with the change in the number of successful vector 
attacks, the vulnerability of the defense vectors also changes 
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depending on the interactions of attackers and defenders. 
This means that when the capabilities of attackers exceed the 
capabilities of defenders, the vulnerability in the protection 
vector that is most at risk will increase, which corresponds 
to a decrease in the security level of this vector. Fig. 5 shows 
the dynamics of the vulnerability of each security vector.
Fig.	5.	Vulnerability	of	attack	vectors	(x24,	x25,	x26)
To better understand the dynamics of investment deci-
sions made by both opponents when the mechanism of the 
weakest link is activated, Fig. 6 shows how attackers and de-
fenders act in accordance with their respective capabilities. 
When an attacker determines the weakest link in the de-
fense, he will use this advantage as long as this advantage is 
relevant and the defender closes the security gap, forcing the 
attacker to switch to another target in the following periods.
Fig.	6.	Distribution	of	investments	by		
attack	vectors	(x8,	x9,	x10)
Fig. 7 shows an increase in the welfare of the attackers 
in the base run. However, defenders can effectively protect 
their information assets, even if attackers successfully attack 
the weakest link in the security vectors.
Fig.	7.	Growth	in	welfare	of	attackers	(x47)
Thus, the simulation experiment showed that attackers 
constantly find the weakest link and direct attacks against 
it (vector A). After the defender blocks attacks, the attacker 
switches to the next weak link.
In the case of a balance between attack vectors (equal 
number of successful attacks in previous periods), the applica-
tion of the weakest link approach is impossible. The capabili-
ties of attackers and defenders are the same, successful attacks 
do not occur, because attackers do not find the weakest link, 
and defenders can effectively protect their information assets.
Thus, the proposed behavior model of interacting agents 
in a cyber conflict has shown that even the simplest behav-
ioral strategies of the attacking side (the “weakest link”) and 
the defense side (“wait and see”) can provide information 
security for the business process loop. In this case, the simu-
lation results presented in Fig. 3–7 show that the attack side 
promptly switches to attacks on a different vector if the at-
tack is successfully repelled on a previously selected vector. 
The defense side redirects investment resources, ensuring 
timely protection of the business processes, identifying the 
weak link in the cybersecurity system at the current time.
The obtained simulation results not only do not contradict 
the simulation results when using other mathematical models 
(both analytical and simulation) of similar processes [42, 43], 
but also significantly supplement the previously obtained 
results. This is achieved due to the fact that, unlike the ones 
mentioned earlier, the model operates not so much with the 
behavior of individual cyber conflict agents as with their joint 
activity, takes into account the mutual influence of agents on 
each other, and also takes into account the influence of the 
confrontation environment, which is a source of random dis-
turbances (in particular, setting the degree of vulnerability of 
various attack vectors and the level of their success).
7. Discussion of the behavior simulation results of  
the interacting parties of cyber conflict 
Analyzing the results, the following features of the rela-
tionship of the dynamics of the simulated processes should 
be noted.
The distribution of successful attacks by vectors (Fig. 3) 
is in accordance with the vulnerability of the protection 
vectors from these attacks (Fig. 5). This corresponds to the 
previously formulated assumptions inherent in the model 
of interaction of antagonistic agents. In particular, as soon 
as the vulnerability of vectors B and C becomes negative, 
the percentage of attacks along vector C drops to zero from 
the initial level of 50. This means that the business process 
loop security system is considered invulnerable to attacks 
on these vectors. After that, the attackers do not take any 
attacks on this vector. The reason for the fall in the vulnera-
bility of vectors is exogenous.
The second interesting feature of the behavior of the 
parties to the conflict is associated with a slight decrease in 
the vulnerability of protection by vector A, which carries out 
the bulk of attacks on the business process loop. When the 
vulnerability drops by 15 % from the initial maximum value 
of 600 over a period of about 2 months, attacks are switched 
almost synchronously along vector B, which follows vector 
A in terms of vulnerability.
Fig. 4 clearly demonstrates the increase in the accumu-
lation of successful attacks on vector B (up to 500 from the 
previously achieved accumulated value of 1,000, which has 
been preserved over the entire previous time). Moreover, 
by the invulnerable vector C (Fig. 5), the accumulation of 
successful attacks is not observed (Fig. 5), since the attacker 
does not consider this vector as promising for attacks.
The distribution of attacks by the corresponding vectors 
and their successful (or unsuccessful) conduct lead to the 
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next investment activity of the defending party, as follows 
from the definition of the “wait and see” scenario. Since 
no attacks are made on vector C as unpromising for the 
attacking side, the share of the defense investment for this 
vector drops to 0. Fig. 6 shows that the initial distribution 
of investments was set as follows: vector A – 0 %, vector B – 
50 %, vector C – 50 %. Since vector A is the most vulnerable, 
which follows from the analysis of the attacks carried out by 
the defense side, the investments are redistributed between 
the vectors, and the share of funds allocated for protection 
(vulnerability reduction) from attacks of vector A increases 
to 80 % of the total. Since the vulnerability of the other two 
vectors is not zero, appropriate means are also allocated to 
ensure protection against attacks on these vectors (B and C). 
In addition, another feature of the defending side behavior 
should be noted. Since no attacks are undertaken with re-
spect to vector C, the defenders cannot make a conclusion 
regarding the vulnerability of this vector (the absence of 
the results of the reflection of attacks due to their absence). 
Therefore, the defender does not reduce investments in vec-
tor C to zero, creating some “insurance” fund in the amount 
of up to 10 % of the total investment.
Fig. 7 shows a decrease in the growth rate of the general 
well-being of attackers, which occurs just at those times when 
the vulnerability of vector A falls, and, accordingly, the num-
ber of successful attacks falls. The growth rate is restored as 
soon as the vulnerability of vector A increases again.
The general conclusion based on the analysis of the model 
variables of conflicting agents interaction in a cyber conflict 
is the consistency of the dynamics of processes in individual 
stages of the security system functioning and the coinci-
dence of the results of modeling the impact of the behavioral 
aspects of cyber conflict on investment processes in security 
systems as a whole with the results of other authors obtained 
on other models of the processes under consideration.
8. Conclusions
1. The basic concepts, the relationships between them 
and the limitations that were used in the development of the 
mathematical model are formed. The concepts were associat-
ed with constants and variables of the developed mathemat-
ical model. Model variables reflect both the behavioral and 
economic aspects of the security system functioning. These 
aspects together determine the nature of the participants’ 
interaction in cyber conflict, influencing the distribution 
of limited investment funds. The formed assumptions and 
limitations of the developed model determine the degree of 
simplicity of the simulated processes and the resulting set of 
the simulated processes.
2. The mathematical model is developed that describes 
the interaction of defenders and attackers in a confron-
tation environment in the form of a system of algebraic 
and differential equations. The chosen form of the model 
representation is traditional for displaying the properties 
of variables and relations between them. This allows to im-
plement the mathematical model in the form of a program 
model in various modeling environments at the subsequent 
stages of modeling (system-dynamic modeling, game-theo-
retic modeling).
3. The process of simulation using the software imple-
mentation of the resulting mathematical model is completed. 
As an option, modeling of the “weakest link” mechanism 
was chosen. This mechanism initiates investment strategies 
for both attackers and defenders. The model did not include 
various financial indicators and approaches for analyzing 
each investment decision, such as: cost-benefit analysis, risk 
analysis, net present value (NPV), annual loss expectancy 
(ALE), return on security investment (ROSI). The simula-
tion result showed good agreement with the results obtained 
by other authors.
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Проводиться дослідження нелінійних гідродинамічних 
характеристик рушійно-стернового комплексу (РСК), які 
вливають на точність плоского траєкторного руху авто-
номного ненаселеного підводного апарата (АНПА). При 
криволінійному русі підводного апарата його РСК працює 
у косому потоці води, що набігає. Це призводить до зни-
ження сили упору РСК і негативно впливає на керований 
траєкторний рух підводного апарату. Дослідження було 
проведено для конкретного типу АНПА для режиму пло-
ского криволінійного руху.
У якості методу дослідження було обрано метод 
математичного моделювання. З цією метою відому 
математичну модель руху АНПА доповнено системою 
керування, що імітує траєкторний рух АНПА. Розроблена 
модель складається з чотирьох основних блоків: удоско-
наленої моделі АНПА; блоку завдання швидкості руху апа-
рату; блоку керування кутом повороту насадки; блоку, 
який містить заздалегідь підготовлені траєкторії руху 
АНПА. 
Представлено результати дослідження гідродинаміч-
них параметрів АНПА для декількох типових траєк-
торій його руху. До досліджуваних параметрів належать 
наступні: необхідний кут повороту насадки; дійсна траєк-
торія руху апарату; швидкість руху апарату; момент на 
валу гребного електродвигуна; упор гребного гвинта.
В результаті проведених досліджень побудовано діа-
граму залежності упору гребного гвинта від кута пово-
роту насадки АНПА в діапазоні швидкості від 0,2 м/с 
до 1 м/с та при повороті насадки в діапазоні до 35°. 
Сформовано трьохвимірну матрицю, яка описує залеж-
ність упору гребного гвинта від кута потоку води, що 
набігає, та швидкості руху апарату. Отримана залеж-
ність може бути використана при синтезі регуляторів 
систем автоматичного керування плоским маневровим 
рухом АНПА підвищеної точності
Ключові слова: автономний ненаселений підводний 
апарат, рушійно-стерновий комплекс, математичне 
моделювання, поворотна насадка
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1. Introduction
Today, in the world leading maritime countries, auton-
omous underwater vehicles (AUVs), which differ signifi-
cantly by architectural and design type, mass-dimensional 
parameters and depths of application, are being created. 
However, all varieties of AUVs combine a common proper-
ty – the ability of controlled trajectory (plane or spatial) 
motion.
The forces acting on the underwater vehicle during such 
motion determine its dynamics and essentially influence 
the vehicle manoeuvrability. Only by having the complete 
information about all the forces affecting the AUV, as well 
as about their control means, the conditions under which it 
is possible to construct vehicle effective automatic control 
systems, can be determined.
That is why, in recent years, more and more attention is 
being paid to the research and improvement of the PSC auto-
